ption to be possible, we already know it to be
actual, and if we know it to be actual, we already know it to be
necessary. A complex conception in the proper sense is the
apprehension of a complex of elements together with the apprehension
of, or insight into, their connexion.[13] Thus, in the case of the
conception of a triangle we see that the possession of three sides
necessitates the possession of three angles. From such a conception
must be distinguished Kant's 'fictitious' conception, i. e. the
apprehension of a complex of elements without the apprehension of
connexion between them. Thus, in the case of the conception of a man
with six toes, there is no apprehension of connexion between the
possession of the characteristics indicated by the term 'man' and the
possession of six toes. In such a case, since we do not apprehend any
connexion between the elements, we do not really 'conceive' or 'think'
the object in question, e. g. a man with six toes. Now in the case of
a complex conception proper, it is impossible to think of a
corresponding individual as only possible. The question 'Is a
triangle, in the sense of a figure with three sides and three angles,
possible?' really means 'Is it possible for a three-sided figure to
have three angles?' To this question we can only answer that we see
that a three-sided figure can have three angles, because we see that
it must have, and therefore has, and can have, three angles; in other
words, that we see a triangle in the sense in question to be possible,
because we see it to be necessary, and, therefore, actual, and
possible. It cannot be argued that our insight is limited to the fact
that if there are three-sided figures they must be three-angled, and
that therefore we only know a triangle in the sense in question to be
possible. Our apprehension of the fact that the possession of three
sides necessitates the possession of three angles presupposes
knowledge of the existence of three-sided figures, for it is only in
an actual three-sided figure that we can apprehend the necessity. It
may, however, be objected that the question ought to mean simply 'Is a
three-sided figure possible?' and that, understood in this sense, it
cannot be answered in a similar way. Nevertheless, a similar answer is
the right answer. For the question 'Is a three-sided figure possible?'
really means 'Is it possible for three straight lines to form a
figure, i. e. to enclose a space?' and we can only an