speak of the irreversibility
of perceptions as if it were the same thing as an irreversibility of
events perceived, and thus to bring in a causal rule. "In this way
alone [i. e. only by deriving the subjective from the objective
sequence] can I be justified in saying of the phenomenon itself, and
not merely of my apprehension, that a sequence is to be found therein,
_which is the same as to say_ that I cannot _arrange_ my apprehension
otherwise than in just this sequence. In conformity with _such a
rule_, therefore, there must exist in that which in general precedes
_an event_ the condition of a rule, according to which _this event
follows always and necessarily_."[38] Here the use of the word
'arrange'[39] and the statement about the rule in the next sentence
imply that Kant has now come to think of the rule of succession as a
causal rule relating to the objective succession. Moreover, if any
doubt remains as to whether Kant really confuses the two
irreversibilities or necessities of succession, it is removed by the
last paragraph of the passage quoted. "If therefore we experience that
something happens, we always thereby presuppose that something
precedes on which _it_ follows according to a rule. For otherwise I
should not say of the object that _it_ follows; because the mere
succession of my apprehension, if _it_ is not determined by a rule in
relation to something preceding, does not justify the assumption of a
succession in the object. It is therefore always in reference to a
rule, according to which _phenomena_ are determined in their sequence
(i. e. as they happen) by the preceding state, that I make my
subjective sequence (of apprehension) objective."[40] The fact is
simply that Kant _must_ identify the two irreversibilities, because,
as has been pointed out, he has only one set of terms to be related as
irreversible, viz. the elements of the manifold, which have to be,
from one point of view, elements of an object and, from another,
representations or apprehensions of it.

[36] The italics are mine. 'According to which' does not
appear to indicate that the two orders referred to are
different.

[37] Cf. B. 242 fin., M. 147 fin.

[38] The italics are mine

[39] _Anstellen._

[40] The italics are mine.

As soon, therefore, as the real nature of Kant's vindication of
causality has been laid bare, it is difficult to describe it as an
argument at all. He is anxious to show that