n event and those which are not. For it is
reasonable to object that it is only possible to say that the order of
our perceptions is irreversible, if and because we already know that
what we have been perceiving is an event, and that therefore any
attempt to argue from the irreversibility of our perceptions to the
existence of a sequence in the object must involve a [Greek: hysteron
proteron]. And it is clear that, if irreversibility in our perceptions
were the only irreversibility to which appeal could be made, even Kant
would not have supposed that the apprehension of a succession was
reached through belief in an irreversibility.

The next paragraph, of which the interpretation is difficult, appears
to introduce a causal rule, i. e. an irreversibility in objects, by
identifying it with the irreversibility in our perceptions of which
Kant has been speaking. The first step to this identification is taken
by the assertion: "In the present case, therefore, I shall have to
derive the subjective sequence of perceptions from the objective
sequence of phenomena.... The latter will consist in the order of the
_manifold of the phenomenon_, according to which _the apprehension_ of
the one (that which happens) follows that of the other (that which
precedes) according to a rule."[36] Here Kant definitely implies that
an objective sequence, i. e. an order or sequence of the _manifold_ of
a phenomenon, consists in a sequence of _perceptions or apprehensions_
of which the order is necessary or according to a rule; in other
words, that a succession of perceptions in the special case where the
succession is necessary is a succession of events perceived.[37] This
implication enables us to understand the meaning of the assertion that
'we must therefore derive the subjective sequence of perceptions from
the objective sequence of phenomena', and to see its connexion with
the preceding paragraph. It means, 'in view of the fact that in all
apprehensions of a succession, and in them alone, the sequence of
perceptions is irreversible, we are justified in saying that a given
sequence of perceptions is the apprehension of a succession, if we
know that the sequence is irreversible; in that case we must be
apprehending a real succession, for an irreversible sequence of
perceptions _is_ a sequence of events perceived.' Having thus implied
that irreversibility of perceptions constitutes them events perceived,
he is naturally enough able to go on to