causality.
Since, then, we do in fact, as even Hume implicitly allowed, succeed
in distinguishing between a succession in objects in nature and a
succession in our apprehension of them, the law of causality must be
true. "It is only under this presupposition (i. e. of causality) that
even the experience of an event is possible."[20]
[20] B. 240, M. 146. For the general view, cf. Caird, i.
556-61.
Kant begins[21] his proof as follows: "Our apprehension of the
manifold of a phenomenon is always successive. The representations of
the parts succeed one another. Whether they succeed one another in the
object also is a second point for reflection which is not contained in
the first."[22] But, before he can continue, the very nature of these
opening sentences compels him to consider a general problem which they
raise. The distinction referred to between a succession in our
apprehensions or representations and a succession in the object
implies an object distinct from the apprehensions or representations.
What, then, can be meant by such an object? For prima facie, if we
ignore the thing in itself as unknowable, there is no object; there
are only representations. But, in that case, what can be meant by a
succession in the object? Kant is therefore once more[23] forced to
consider the question 'What is meant by object of representations?'
although on this occasion with special reference to the meaning of a
succession in the object; and the vindication of causality is bound up
with the answer. The answer is stated thus:
[21] The preceding paragraph is an addition of the second
edition.
[22] B. 234, M. 142.
[23] Cf. A. 104-5, Mah. 198-9, and pp. 178-86 and 230-3.
"Now we may certainly give the name of object to everything, and even
to every representation, so far as we are conscious thereof; but what
this word may mean in the case of phenomena, not in so far as they (as
representations) are objects, but in so far as they only indicate an
object, is a question requiring deeper consideration. So far as they,
as representations only, are at the same time objects of
consciousness, they are not to be distinguished from apprehension,
i. e. reception into the synthesis of imagination, and we must
therefore say, 'The manifold of phenomena is always produced
successively in the mind'. If phenomena were things in themselves, no
man would be able to infer from the succession of the representations
of t
|