matter, i. e. in bodies in space,[15] but the assertion is
incompatible with the phenomenal character of the world; for the
sensations or appearances produced in us by the thing in itself cannot
be successive states of bodies in space. In the third place, in spite
of Kant's protests against any proof which is 'dogmatical' or 'from
conceptions', such a proof really forms the basis of his thought. For
if the argument is to proceed not from the nature of change as such
but from the possibility of perceiving change, it must not take into
account any implications of the possibility of perceiving change which
rest upon implications of the nature of change as such. Yet this is
what the argument does. For the reason really given for the view that
the apprehension of change involves the apprehension of the manifold
as related to a permanent substratum is that a change, as such,
implies a permanent substratum. It is only because change is held to
imply a substratum that we are said to be able to apprehend a change
only in relation to a substratum. Moreover, shortly afterwards, Kant,
apparently without realizing what he is doing, actually uses what is,
on the very face of it, the dogmatic method, and in accordance with it
develops the implications of the perception of change. "Upon this
permanence is based the justification of the conception of _change_.
Coming into being and perishing are not changes of that which comes to
be or perishes. Change is but a mode of existence, which follows on
another mode of existence of the same object. Hence everything which
changes _endures_ and only its _condition changes_.... Change,
therefore, can be perceived only in substances, and absolute coming to
be or perishing, which does not concern merely a determination of the
permanent, cannot be a possible perception."[16] Surely the fact that
Kant is constrained in spite of himself to use the dogmatic method is
some indication that it is the right method. It is in reality
impossible to make any discoveries about change, or indeed about
anything, except by consideration of the nature of the thing itself;
no study of the conditions under which it can be apprehended can throw
any light upon its nature.[17] Lastly, although the supposition is not
so explicit as the corresponding supposition made in the case of the
other analogies, Kant's argument really assumes, and assumes wrongly,
the existence of a process by which, starting with the successive
app