element in knowledge, is really the knowledge itself. Again,
since the reality to be known is a whole of parts which we construct
on a principle, we know that it is such a whole, and therefore that
'the manifold is related to one object', because, and only because, we
know that we have combined the elements on a principle.
Self-consciousness therefore _must_ be inseparable from consciousness
of an object.

[31] It is for this reason that the mathematical
illustrations of the synthesis are the most plausible for his
theory. While we can be said to construct geometrical
figures, and while the construction of geometrical figures
can easily be mistaken for the apprehension of them, we
cannot with any plausibility be said to construct the
physical world.

[32] A. 125, Mah. 214. Cf. the other passages quoted pp.
211-12.

The fundamental objection to this account of knowledge seems so
obvious as to be hardly worth stating; it is of course that knowing
and making are not the same. The very nature of knowing presupposes
that the thing known is already made, or, to speak more accurately,
already exists.[33] In other words, knowing is essentially the
discovery of what already is. Even if the reality known happens to be
something which we make, e. g. a house, the knowing it is distinct
from the making it, and, so far from being identical with the making,
presupposes that the reality in question is already made. Music and
poetry are, no doubt, realities which in some sense are 'made' or
'composed', but the apprehension of them is distinct from and
presupposes the process by which they are composed.

[33] Cf. Ch. VI.

How difficult it is to resolve knowing into making may be seen by
consideration of a difficulty in the interpretation of Kant's phrase
'relation of the manifold to an object', to which no allusion has yet
been made. When it is said that a certain manifold is related to, or
stands[34] in relation to, an object, does the relatedness referred to
consist in the fact that the manifold is combined into a whole, or in
the fact that we are conscious of the combination, or in both? If we
accept the first alternative we must allow that, while relatedness to
an object implies a process of synthesis, yet the relatedness, and
therefore the synthesis, have nothing to do with knowledge. For the
relatedness of the manifold to an object will be the combination of
the elements of the manif