cessary for
knowledge, he does not consistently adhere to this. For his general
view is that the elements combined and recognized as combined are the
original data of sense, and not reproductions of them which together
form an image, and his instances imply that the elements retained in
thought, i. e. the elements of which we are aware subsequently to
perception, are the elements originally perceived, e. g. the parts of
a line or the units counted.[38] Moreover, in one passage Kant
definitely describes certain _objects_ of _perception_ taken together
as an _image_ of that 'kind' of which, when taken together, they are
an instance. "If I place five points one after another, . . . . . this
is an image of the number five."[39] Now, if it be granted that Kant
has in mind normally the process of imagining, we can see why he found
no difficulty in the thought of knowledge as construction. For while
we cannot reasonably speak of making _an object of knowledge_, we can
reasonably speak of making _a mental image_ through our own activity,
and also of making it in accordance with the categories and the
empirical laws which presuppose them. Moreover, the ease with which it
is possible to take the imagining which accompanies knowing for
knowing[40]--the image formed being taken to be the object known and
the forming it being taken to be the knowing it--renders it easy to
transfer the thought of construction to the knowledge itself. The only
defect, however, under which the view labours is the important one
that, whatever be the extent to which imagination must accompany
knowledge, it is distinct from knowledge. To realize the difference we
have only to notice that the process by which we present to ourselves
in imagination realities not present to perception presupposes, and is
throughout guided by, the knowledge of them. It should be noted,
however, that, although the process of which Kant is normally thinking
is doubtless that of constructing mental imagery, his real view must
be that knowledge consists in constructing a world out of the data of
sense, or, more accurately, as his instances show, out of the objects
of isolated perceptions, e. g. parts of a line or units to be counted.
Otherwise the final act of recognition would be an apprehension not of
the world of nature, but of an image of it.

[37] B. 152, M. 93; cf. also Mah. 211, A. 120.

[38] Cf. A. 102-3, Mah. 197-8. The fact is that the appeal to
reproducti