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hat 2 and 2 _are_ 4. Lastly, it must be allowed that the use of the phrase 'putting two and two together', to describe an inference from facts not quite obviously connected, is loose and inexact. If we meet a dog with a blood-stained mouth and shortly afterwards see a dead fowl, we may be said to put two and two together and to conclude thereby that the dog killed the fowl. But, strictly speaking, in drawing the inference we do not put anything together. We certainly do not put together the facts that the mouth of the dog is blood-stained and that the fowl has just been killed. We do not even put the premises together, i. e. our apprehensions of these facts. What takes place should be described by saying simply that seeing that the fowl is killed, we also remember that the dog's mouth was stained, and then apprehend a connexion between these facts. [41] Cf. Caird, i. 394, where Dr. Caird speaks of 'the distinction of the activity of thought from the matter which it _combines or recognizes as combined_ in the idea of an object'. (The italics are mine.) The context seems to indicate that the phrase is meant to express the truth, and not merely Kant's view. [42] Cf. the account of judgement in Mr. Bradley's _Logic_. [43] Cf. the account of inference in Mr. Bradley's _Logic_. [44] Cf. Bradley, _Logic_, pp. 370 and 506. The fact seems to be that the thought of synthesis in no way helps to elucidate the nature of knowing, and that the mistake in principle which underlies Kant's view lies in the implicit supposition that it is possible to elucidate the nature of knowledge by means of something other than itself. Knowledge is _sui generis_ and therefore a 'theory' of it is impossible. Knowledge is simply knowledge, and any attempt to state it in terms of something else must end in describing something which is not knowledge.[45] [45] Cf. p. 124. CHAPTER X THE SCHEMATISM OF THE CATEGORIES As has already been pointed out,[1] the _Analytic_ is divided into two parts, the _Analytic of Conceptions_, of which the aim is to discover and vindicate the validity of the categories, and the _Analytic of Principles_, of which the aim is to determine the use of the categories in judgement. The latter part, which has now to be considered, is subdivided into two. It has, according to Kant, firstly to determine the sensuous conditions under which the categories are used, and
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