Kant only
'appearances', resemble mental images more closely than they
do as usually conceived.

[8] Cf. B. 176, M. 107. That individuals are really referred
to is also implied in the assertion that 'the synthesis of
imagination has for its aim no single _perception_, but
merely unity in the determination of sensibility'. (The
italics are mine.)

[9] Two sentences treat individual objects and images as
if they might be mentioned indifferently. "An object of
experience or an image of it always falls short of the
empirical conception to a far greater degree than does
the schema." "The conception of a 'dog' signifies a rule
according to which my imagination can draw the general
outline of the figure of a four-footed animal without being
limited to any single particular form which experience
presents to me, or indeed to any possible image that I can
represent to myself _in concreto_."

If, however, we go on to ask what is required of schemata and of the
process of schematizing, if they are to enable the manifold to be
subsumed under the categories, we see that each of these three
characteristics makes it impossible for them to fulfil this purpose.
For firstly, an individual manifold A has to be brought under a
category B. Since _ex hypothesi_ this cannot be effected directly,
there is needed a mediating conception C. C, therefore, it would seem,
must be at once a species of B and a conception of which A is an
instance. In any case C must be a conception relating to the reality
to be known, and not to any process of knowing on our part, and,
again, it must be more concrete than B. This is borne out by the list
of the schemata of the categories. But, although a schema may be said
to be more concrete than the corresponding conception, in that it
presupposes the conception, it neither is nor involves a more
concrete conception of an _object_ and in fact, as has been pointed
out, relates not to the reality to be known but to the process on our
part by which we construct or apprehend it.[10] In the second place,
the time in respect of which the category B has to be made more
concrete must relate to the object, and not to the successive process
by which we apprehend it, whereas the time involved in a schema
concerns the latter and not the former. In the third place, from the
point of view of the categories, the process of schematizing should be
a process wh