ereby we combine the manifold into a whole A in accordance
with the conception C, and thereby render _possible_ the subsumption
of A under the category B. If it be a process which actually subsumes
the manifold under B, it will _actually_ perform that, the very
impossibility of which has made it necessary to postulate such a
process at all. For, according to Kant, it is just the fact that the
manifold cannot be subsumed directly under the categories that renders
schematism necessary. Yet, on Kant's general account of a schema, the
schematizing must actually bring a manifold under the corresponding
conception. If we present to ourselves an individual triangle by
successively joining three lines according to the conception of a
triangle, i. e. so that they enclose a space, we are directly bringing
the manifold, i. e. the lines, under the conception of a triangle.
Again, if we present to ourselves an instance of a group of 100 by
combining 10 groups of 10 units of any kind, we are directly bringing
the units under the conception of 100. If this consideration be
applied to the schematism of a category, we see that the process said
to be necessary because a certain other process is impossible is the
very process said to be impossible.

[10] It may be objected that, from Kant's point of view, the
thought of a rule of construction, and the thought of the
principle of the whole to be constructed, are the same thing
from different points of view. But if this be insisted on,
the schema and its corresponding conception become the same
thing regarded from different points of view; consequently
the schema will not be a more concrete conception of an
object than the corresponding conception, but it will be the
conception itself.

If, therefore, Kant succeeds in finding schemata of the categories in
detail in the sense in which they are required for the solution of his
problem, i. e. in the sense of more concrete conceptions involving the
thought of time and relating to objects, we should expect either that
he ignores his general account of a schema, or that if he appeals to
it, the appeal is irrelevant. This we find to be the case. His account
of the first two transcendental schemata makes a wholly irrelevant
appeal to the temporal process of synthesis on our part, while his
account of the remaining schemata makes no attempt to appeal to it at
all.

"The pure _schema_ of _quantity_, as a concep