nomena
and their mere form is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul,
whose true modes of action we are not likely ever to discover from
Nature and unveil. Thus much only can we say: the _image_ is a product
of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination, while the
_schema_ of sensuous conceptions (such as of figures in space) is a
product and, as it were, a monogram of the pure _a priori_
imagination, through which, and according to which, images first
become possible, though the images must be connected with the
conception only by means of the schema which they express, and are in
themselves not fully adequate to it. On the other hand, the schema of
a pure conception of the understanding is something which cannot be
brought to an image; on the contrary, it is only the pure synthesis in
accordance with a rule of unity according to conceptions in general, a
rule of unity which the category expresses, and it is a transcendental
product of the imagination which concerns the determination of the
inner sense in general according to conditions of its form (time)
with reference to all representations, so far as these are to be
connected _a priori_ in one conception according to the unity of
apperception."[6]
[6] B. 179-81, M. 109-10.
Now, in order to determine whether schemata can constitute the desired
link between the pure conceptions or categories and the manifold of
sense, it is necessary to follow closely this account of a schema.
Kant unquestionably in this passage treats as a mental image related
to a conception what really is, and what on his own theory ought to
have been, an individual object related to a conception, i. e. an
instance of it. In other words, he takes a mental image of an
individual for the individual itself.[7] On the one hand, he treats a
schema of a conception throughout as the thought of a procedure of the
imagination to present to the conception its _image_, and he opposes
schemata not to objects but to _images_; on the other hand, his
problem concerns subsumption under a conception, and what is subsumed
must be an instance of the conception, i. e. an individual object of
the kind in question.[8] Again, in asserting that if I place five
points one after another, . . . . . this is an image of the number
five, he is actually saying that an individual group of five points is
an image of a group of five in general.[9] Further, if the process of
schematizing is to enter--as it m
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