called the transcendental function of the
imagination. It is therefore strange indeed, but nevertheless clear
from the preceding, that only by means of this transcendental function
of the imagination does even the affinity of phenomena, and with it
their association and, through this, lastly their reproduction
according to laws, and consequently experience itself become possible,
because without it no conceptions of objects would ever come together
into one experience."[13]
[13] A. 119-23, Mah. 210-3.
If it were not for the last two paragraphs[14], we should understand
this difficult passage to be substantially identical in meaning with
the defence of the affinity of phenomena just given.[15] We should
understand Kant to be saying (1) that the synthesis which knowledge
requires presupposes not merely a faculty of association on our part
by which we reproduce elements of the manifold according to rules, but
also an affinity on the part of the manifold to be apprehended, which
enables our faculty of association to get to work, and (2) that this
affinity can be vindicated as a presupposition at once of knowledge
and of self-consciousness.
[14] And also the first and last sentence of the fourth
paragraph, where Kant speaks not of 'phenomena which are to
be apprehended', but of the 'apprehension of phenomena' as
necessarily agreeing with the unity of apperception.
[15] p. 220.
In view, however, of the fact that, according to the last two
paragraphs, the affinity is due to the imagination,[16] it seems
necessary to interpret the passage thus:
[16] It should be noted that in the last paragraph but one
Kant does not say '_our knowledge_ that phenomena must have
affinity is a consequence of _our knowledge_ that there must
be a synthesis of the imagination', but 'the affinity of all
phenomena is a consequence of a synthesis in the
imagination'. And the last paragraph precludes the view that
in making the latter statement he meant the former. Cf. also
A. 101, Mah. 196.
'Since the given manifold of sense consists of isolated elements, this
manifold, in order to enter into knowledge, must be combined into an
image. This combination is effected by the imagination, which however
must first apprehend the elements one by one.'
'But this apprehension of the manifold by the imagination could
produce no image, unless the imagination also possessed the power of
rep
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