the distinction between the sensibility and the
understanding as that between the passive faculty by which an
individual is given or presented to us and the active faculty by which
we bring an individual under, or recognize it as an instance of a
universal.[21] For we then see that Kant in the _Transcendental
Deduction_, by treating what is given by the sensibility as terms and
what is contributed by the understanding as relations, is really
confusing the distinction between a relation and its terms with that
between universal and individual; in other words, he says of terms
what ought to be said of individuals, and of relations what ought to
be said of universals. That the confusion is a confusion, and not a
legitimate identification, it is easy to see. For, on the one hand, a
relation between terms is as much an individual as either of the
terms. That a body A is to the right of a body B is as much an
individual fact as either A or B.[22] And if terms, as being
individuals, belong to perception and are given, in the sense that
they are in an immediate relation to us, relations, as being
individuals, equally belong to perception and are given. On the other
hand, individual terms just as much as individual relations imply
corresponding universals. An individual body implies 'bodiness', just
as much as the fact that a body A is to the right of a body B implies
the relationship of 'being to the right of something'. And if, as is
the case, thinking or conceiving in distinction from perceiving, is
that activity by which we recognize an individual, given in
perception, as one of a kind, conceiving is involved as much in the
apprehension of a term as in the apprehension of a relation. The
apprehension of 'this red body' as much involves the recognition of an
individual as an instance of a kind, i. e. as much involves an act of
the understanding, as does the apprehension of the fact that it is
brighter than some other body.
[21] Cf. pp. 27-9.
[22] I can attach no meaning to Mr. Bertrand Russell's
assertion that relations have no instances. See _The
Principles of Mathematics_, Sec. 55.
Kant has failed to notice this confusion for two reasons. In the first
place, beginning in the _Analytic_ with the thought that the thing in
itself, by acting on our sensibility, produces isolated sense data, he
is led to adopt a different view of the understanding from that which
he originally gave, and to conceive its bus
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