old
does in fact 'fit' the categories. But the retort is obvious. Any
actual conformity of the manifold to the categories would upon this
view be at best but an empirical fact, and, although, if the
conformity ceased, we should cease to be aware of a world and of
ourselves, no reason has been or can be given why the conformity
should not cease.

[10] Cf. A. 100-2, Mah. 195-7 (quoted pp. 171-2); A. 113,
Mah. 205; A. 121-2, Mah. 211-2.

The passage in which Kant vindicates the affinity of phenomena in the
greatest detail is the following:

"We will now try to exhibit the necessary connexion of the
understanding with phenomena by means of the categories, by beginning
from below, i. e. from the empirical end. The first that is given us
is a phenomenon, which if connected with consciousness is called
perception[11].... But because every phenomenon contains a manifold,
and consequently different perceptions are found in the mind scattered
and single, a connexion of them is necessary, which they cannot have
in mere sense. There is, therefore, in us an active power of synthesis
of this manifold, which we call imagination, and the action of which,
when exercised immediately upon perceptions, I call apprehension. The
business of the imagination, that is to say, is to bring the manifold
of intuition[12] into an _image_; it must, therefore, first receive
the impressions into its activity, i. e. apprehend them."

[11] _Wahrnehmung._

[12] _Anschauung._

"But it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold would not
by itself produce an image and a connexion of the impressions, unless
there were a subjective ground in virtue of which one perception, from
which the mind has passed to another, is summoned to join that which
follows, and thus whole series of perceptions are presented, i. e. a
reproductive power of imagination, which power, however, is also only
empirical."

"But if representations reproduced one another at haphazard just as
they happened to meet together, once more no determinate connexion
would arise, but merely chaotic heaps of them, and consequently no
knowledge would arise; therefore the reproduction of them must have a
rule, according to which a representation enters into connexion with
this rather than with another in the imagination. This subjective and
_empirical_ ground of reproduction according to rules is called the
_association_ of representations."

"But now, if this unit