ss, and thence to
conclude that a synthesis must be possible. But if, as it is his point
to urge, consciousness of our identity only takes place through
consciousness of the synthesis, this method of argument must be
invalid. It would clearly be necessary to know that the synthesis is
possible, _before_ and _in order that_ we could know that
self-consciousness is possible. An objector has only to urge that the
manifold might be such that it could not be combined into a systematic
whole, in order to secure the admission that in that case
self-consciousness would not be possible.
[81] Cf. p. 198.
Nevertheless, the passage under consideration may be said to lay bare
an important presupposition of self-consciousness. It is true that
self-consciousness would be impossible, if we merely apprehended the
parts of the world in isolation. To be conscious that I who am
perceiving C perceived B and A, I must be conscious at once of A, B,
and C, in one act of consciousness or apprehension. To be conscious
separately of A and B and C is not to be conscious of A and B and C.
And, to be conscious of A and B and C in one act of consciousness, I
must apprehend A, B, and C as related, i. e. as forming parts of a
whole or system. Hence it is only because our consciousness of A, B,
and C is never the consciousness of a mere A, a mere B, and a mere C,
but is always the consciousness of A B C as elements in one world that
we can be conscious of our identity in apprehending A, B, and C. If
_per impossibile_ our apprehension be supposed to cease to be an
apprehension of a plurality of objects in relation, self-consciousness
must be supposed to cease also. At the same time, it is impossible to
argue from the consciousness of our identity in apprehending to the
consciousness of what is apprehended as a unity, and thence to the
existence of that unity. For, apart from the consideration that in
fact all thinking presupposes the relatedness or--what is the same
thing--the necessary relatedness of objects to one another, and that
therefore any assertion to the contrary is meaningless, the
consciousness of objects as a unity is a condition of the
consciousness of our identity, and therefore any doubt that can be
raised in regard to the former can be raised equally with regard to
the latter.
We may now pass to the concluding portion of the deduction. For the
purpose of considering it, we may sum up the results of the preceding
discussion by
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