etic unity of which Kant is thinking is the unity
of nature. For, as Kant of course was aware, in our ordinary
consciousness we do not apprehend the interconnexion of the parts
of nature in detail, but only believe that there is such an
interconnexion; consequently he naturally weakened the conclusion
which he ought to have drawn, viz. that self-consciousness presupposes
consciousness of the synthesis, in order to make it conform to the
facts of our ordinary consciousness. Yet, if his _argument_ is
to be defended, its conclusion must be taken in the form that
self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of the actual synthesis
or connexion and not merely of the possibility of it. In the _third_
place, Kant twice in this passage[72] definitely makes the act of
synthesis, which his argument maintains to be the condition of
_consciousness of the identity_ of ourselves, the condition of the
_identity_ of ourselves. The fact is that, on Kant's view, the act of
synthesis of the representations is really a condition of their
belonging to one self, the self being presupposed to be a self capable
of self-consciousness.[73]

[70] More accurately, 'of the possibility of the
connectedness'.

[71] The same view seems implied A. 117-8, Mah. 208. Kant
apparently thinks of this consciousness as also a
self-consciousness (cf. Sec. 9), though it seems that he
should have considered it rather as a condition of
self-consciousness, cf. p. 204, note 2.

[72] Sections 6 and 10.

[73] Cf. pp. 202-3.

We may now turn to the first of the two main points to be considered,
viz. the reason given by Kant for holding that self-consciousness must
be possible. In the first paragraph (Secs. 1-4) Kant appears twice to
state a reason, viz. in Secs. 1 and 4. What is meant by the first
sentence, "It must be possible that the 'I think' should accompany all
my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me
which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would
either be impossible or at least for me nothing"? It is difficult to
hold that 'my representations' here means objects of which I am aware,
and that the thesis to be established is that I must be capable of
being conscious of my own identity throughout all awareness or thought
of objects. For the next sentence refers to perceptions as
representations which can be given previously to all thought, and
therefore, presumably, as