something of which I am not necessarily
aware. Again, the ground adduced for the thesis would be in part a
mere restatement of it, and in part nonsense. It would be 'otherwise
something would be apprehended with respect to which I could not be
aware that I was apprehending it; in other words, I could not
apprehend it [since otherwise I could be aware that I was apprehending
it]', the last words being incapable of any interpretation. It is much
more probable that though Kant is leading up to self-consciousness,
the phrase 'I think' here refers not to 'consciousness that I am
thinking', but to 'thinking'. He seems to mean 'It must be possible to
apprehend all my 'affections' (i. e. sensations or appearances in me),
for otherwise I should have an affection of which I could not be
aware; in other words, there could be no such affection, or at least
it would be of no possible importance to me.'[74] And on this
interpretation self-consciousness is not introduced till Sec. 3, and
then only surreptitiously. On neither interpretation, however, does
Kant give the vestige of a _reason_ for the possibility of
self-consciousness. Again, it seems clear that in Sec. 4 'my
representations', and 'representations which belong to me' mean
objects of which I am aware (i. e. something presented); for he says
of my representations, not that I may not be conscious of them--which
he should have said if 'my representations' meant my mental affections
of which I could become conscious--but that I may not be conscious of
them as my representations. Consequently in Sec. 4 he is merely
asserting that I must be able to be conscious of my identity throughout
my awareness of objects. So far, then, we find merely the _assertion_
that self-consciousness must be possible.[75]

[74] A third alternative is to understand Kant to be thinking
of all thought as self-conscious, i. e. as thinking
accompanied by the consciousness of thinking. But since in
that case Kant would be arguing from thinking as _thinking_,
i. e. as apprehending objects, the possibility of
self-consciousness would only be glaringly assumed.

[75] The same is true of A. 116 and A. 117 note, Mah. 208,
where Kant also appears to be offering what he considers to
be an argument.

In the next paragraph[76]--which is clearly meant to be the important
one--Kant, though he can hardly be said to be aware of it, seems to
_assume_ that it is the very nature of