the unity of it the
_transcendental_ unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the
possibility of _a priori_ knowledge arising from it. For the manifold
representations which are given in a perception would not all of them
be _my_ representations, if they did not all belong to one
self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even though I am
not conscious of them as such), they must necessarily conform to the
condition under which alone they _can_ stand together in a universal
self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all belong to me.
From this original connexion much can be concluded."
[64] This is an indisputable case of the use of
representation in the sense of something represented or
presented.
[65] I. e. consciousness of our identity is final; we cannot,
for instance, go further back to a consciousness of the
consciousness of our identity.
[5.] "That is to say, this thorough-going identity of the apperception
of a manifold given in perception contains a synthesis of
representations,[66] and is possible only through the consciousness of
this synthesis.[67] [6.] For the empirical consciousness which
accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary, and
without relation to the identity of the subject. [7.] This relation,
therefore, takes place not by my merely accompanying every
representation with consciousness, but by my _adding_ one
representation to another, and being conscious of the synthesis of
them. [8.] Consequently, only because I can connect a manifold of
given representations _in one consciousness_, is it possible for me to
represent to myself the _identity of consciousness in these
representations_; i. e. the _analytical_ unity of apperception is
possible only under the presupposition of a _synthetical_ unity. [9.]
The thought, 'These representations given in perception belong all of
them to me' is accordingly just the same as, 'I unite them in one
self-consciousness, or at least can so unite them;' [10.] and although
this thought is not itself as yet the consciousness of the _synthesis_
of representations, it nevertheless presupposes the possibility of
this synthesis; that is to say, it is only because I can comprehend
the manifold of representations in one consciousness, that I call them
all _my_ representations; for otherwise I should have as many-coloured
and varied a self as I have representations of which I am conscious.
[11.
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