second_ place, both the problem which Kant raises and the clue
which he offers for its solution involve an impossible separation of
knowledge or a representation from its object. Kant begins with the
thought of a phenomenon as a mere representation which, as mental, and
as the representation of an object, is just not an object, and asks,
'What is meant by the object of it?' He finds the clue to the answer
in the thought that though a representation or idea when considered in
itself is a mere mental modification, yet, when considered as related
to an object, it is subject to a certain necessity. In fact, however,
an idea or knowledge is essentially an idea or knowledge of an object,
and we are bound to think of it as such. There is no meaning whatever
in saying that the thought of an idea as related to an object carries
with it something of necessity, for to say so implies that it is
possible to think of it as unrelated to an object. Similarly there is
really no meaning in the question, 'What is meant by an object
corresponding to knowledge or to an idea?' for this in the same way
implies that we can first think of an idea as unrelated to an object
and then ask, 'What can be meant by an object corresponding to
it?'[43] In the _third_ place, Kant only escapes the absurdity
involved in the thought of a mere idea or a mere representation
by treating representations either as parts or as qualities of an
object. For although he speaks of our cognitions,[44] i. e. of our
representations, as being determined by the object, he says that they
must agree, i. e. they must have that unity which constitutes the
conception of an object, and he illustrates representations by the
sides of an individual triangle and the impenetrability and shape of
an individual body, which are just as 'objective' as the objects to
which they relate. The fact is that he really treats a representation
not as his problem requires that it should be treated, i. e. as a
representation of something, but as something represented,[45] i. e.
as something of which we are aware, viz. a part or a quality of an
object. In the _fourth_ place, not only is that which Kant speaks of
as related to an object really not a representation, but also--as we
see if we consider the fact which Kant has in mind--that to which he
speaks of it as related is really not _an_ object but _one and the
same object to which another so-called representation is related_. For
what Kant says is
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