n has been retained for the
sake of uniformity.

[38] _Erkenntnisse._

[39] A. 104, Mah. 199.

Kant's meaning seems to be this: 'If we think of certain
representations, e. g. certain lines[40] or the representations of
extension, impenetrability, and shape,[41] as related to an object,
e. g. to an individual triangle or an individual body, we think that
they must be mutually consistent or, in other words, that they must
have the unity of being parts of a necessarily related whole or
system, this unity in fact constituting the conception of an object
in general, in distinction from the conception of an object of a
particular kind. The latter thought in turn involves the thought of
the object of representations as that which prevents them being
anything whatever and in fact makes them parts of a system. The
thought therefore of representations as related to an object carries
with it the thought of a certain necessity, viz. the necessary or
systematic unity introduced into the representations by the object.
Hence by an object of representations we mean something which
introduces into the representations a systematic unity which
constitutes the nature of an object in general, and the relatedness of
representations to, or their correspondence with, an object involves
their systematic unity.'[42]

[40] Cf. A. 105, Mah. 199.

[41] Cf. A. 106, Mah. 200.

[42] It may be noticed that possession of the unity of a
system does not really distinguish 'an object' from any other
whole of parts, nor in particular from 'a representation'.
Any whole of parts must be a systematic unity.

Certain points, however, should be noticed. In the _first_ place, Kant
is for the moment tacitly ignoring his own theory of knowledge, in
accordance with which the object proper, i. e. the thing in itself, is
unknowable, and is reverting to the ordinary conception of knowledge
as really _knowledge_ of its object. For the elements which are said,
in virtue of being related to an object, to agree and to have the
unity which constitutes the conception of an object must be elements
of an object which we know; for if the assertion that they agree is
to be significant, they must be determinate parts or qualities of the
object, e. g. the sides of an individual triangle or the
impenetrability or shape of an individual body, and therefore it is
implied that we know that the object has these parts or qualities. In
the _