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conceptions of its own, it is able under certain other conditions to originate and use such conceptions, i. e. categories.[24] Hence if we attend only to the professed procedure of the deduction, we are compelled to admit that the deduction not only excludes any use of the 'clue' to the categories, supposed to be furnished by Formal Logic, but even fails to deduce them at all. For it does not even nominally attempt to discover the categories in detail, but reverts to the prior task of showing merely that there are categories. Doubtless Kant thinks that the forms of judgement formulated by Formal Logic in some way _suggest_ the conceptions which become operative in thought under these other conditions. Nevertheless, it is impossible to see how these forms of judgement can suggest these conceptions, unless they actually presuppose them. It is clear, however, that the professed link[25] between the forms of judgement and the categories does not represent the actual process by which Kant reached his list of categories; for he could never have reached any list of categories by an argument which was merely directed to show that there are categories. Moreover, an inspection of the list shows that he actually reached it partly by noticing the conceptions which the forms of judgement seemed to presuppose, and partly by bearing in mind the general conceptions underlying physics which it was his ultimate aim to vindicate. Since this is the case, and since the categories can only be connected with the forms of judgement by showing that they are presupposed in them, the proper question to be considered from the point of view of the metaphysical deduction is simply whether the forms of judgement really presuppose the categories.[26] [23] B. 102-5, M. 62-3. [24] Cf. p. 166. [25] B. 102-5, M. 62-3. [26] As we shall see later, the real importance of the passage in which Kant professes to effect the transition from the forms of judgement to the categories (B. 102-5, M. 62-3) lies in its introduction of a new and important line of thought, on which the transcendental deduction turns. Consideration of it is therefore deferred to the next chapter. If, however, we examine the forms of judgement distinguished by Formal Logic, we find that they do not presuppose the categories. To see this, it is only necessary to examine the four main divisions of judgement _seriatim_. The first divi
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