ss which _unites_ the
manifold gradually perceived and then reproduced into _one_
representation'.[33] But these statements are not decisive, for he
uses the term 'recognition' in his formula for the work of the
understanding, and he illustrates its work by pointing out that in
counting we must _remember_ that we have added the units. Moreover,
there is a consideration which by itself makes it necessary to accept
the former interpretation. The passage certainly represents the
understanding as recognizing the identical action of the mind in
combining the manifold on a principle, whether or not it also
represents the understanding as the source of this activity. But if
it were the understanding which combined the manifold, there would
be no synthesis which the imagination could be supposed to have
performed,[34] and therefore it could play no part in knowledge at
all, a consequence which must be contrary to Kant's meaning. Further
if, as the general tenor of the deduction shows, the imagination is
really only the understanding working unreflectively,[35] we are able
to understand why Kant should for the moment cease to distinguish
between the imagination and the understanding, and consequently should
use language which implies that the understanding both combines the
manifold on a principle and makes us conscious of our activity in so
doing. Hence we may say that the real meaning of the passage should
be stated thus: 'Knowledge requires one consciousness which,
as imagination, combines the manifold on a definite principle
constituted by a conception,[36] and, as understanding, is to some
extent conscious of its identical activity in so doing, this
self-consciousness being, from the side of the whole produced by the
synthesis, the consciousness of the conception by which the manifold
is unified.'

[32] The italics are mine. He does not say '_we should not be
conscious_ of what we are thinking as the same representation
and as belonging [Greek: ktl]., _and we should not be
conscious_ of the manifold as constituting a whole.

[33] The italics are mine.

[34] There could not, of course, be two syntheses, the one
being and the other not being upon a principle.

[35] Cf. pp. 168-9.

[36] In view of Kant's subsequent account of the function of
the categories it should be noticed that, according to the
present passage, the conception involved in an act of
knowledge is the co