umerical; but understood in this sense it is
merely a weakened form of the universal judgement in which
the connexion apprehended between subject and predicate terms
is incomplete.

The second division of judgements is said to be a division in respect
of quality into affirmative, negative, and infinite, i. e. into
species which may be illustrated by the judgements, 'A college is a
place of education,' 'A college is not a hotel,' and 'A college is a
not-hotel'. The conceptions involved are said to be those of reality,
of negation, and of limitation respectively. The conception of
limitation may be ignored, since the infinite judgement said to
presuppose it is a fiction. On the other hand, the conceptions of
reality and negation, even if their existence be conceded, cannot be
allowed to be the conceptions presupposed. For when we affirm or deny,
we affirm or deny of something not mere being, but being of a
particular kind. The conceptions presupposed are rather those of
identity and difference. It is only because differences fall within an
identity that we can affirm, and it is only because within an identity
there are differences that we can deny.

The third division of judgements is said to be in respect of relation
into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgements. Here,
again, the conclusion which Kant desires is clearly impossible. The
categorical judgement may be said to presuppose the conception of
subject and attribute, but not that of substance and accident. The
hypothetical judgement may be conceded to presuppose the conception of
reason and consequence, but it certainly does not presuppose the
conception of cause and effect.[29] Lastly, while the disjunctive
judgement may be said to presuppose the conception of mutually
exclusive species of a genus, it certainly does not presuppose the
conception of reciprocal action between physical things.

[29] No doubt, as the schematism of the categories shows,
Kant does not think that the hypothetical judgement
_directly_ involves the conception of cause and effect, i. e.
of the relation of necessary succession between the various
states of physical things. The point is, however, that the
hypothetical judgement does not involve it at all.

The fourth division of judgement is said to be in respect of modality
into assertoric, problematic, and apodeictic, the conceptions
involved being respectively those of possibility and i