sion of judgements is said to be a division in respect
of quantity into singular, particular, and universal. So stated, the
division is numerical. It is a division of judgements according as
they make an assertion about one, more than one, or all the members of
a kind. Each species may be said to presuppose (1) the conception of
quantity, and (2) a conception peculiar to itself: the first
presupposing the conception of one member of a kind, the second that
of more than one but less than all members of a kind, the third that
of all members of a kind. Moreover, a judgement of each kind may
perhaps be said to relate the predicate conception to the subject
conception by means of one of these three conceptions.

The fundamental division, however, into which universal and singular
judgements enter is not numerical at all, and ignores particular
judgements altogether. It is that between such judgements as
'Three-sided figures, as such, are three-angled' and 'This man is
tall'. The essential distinction is that in the universal judgement
the predicate term is apprehended to belong to the subject through
our insight that it is necessitated by the nature of the subject term,
while in the singular judgement our apprehension that the predicate
term belongs to the subject is based upon the perception or experience
of the coexistence of predicate and subject terms in a common subject.
In other words, it is the distinction between an _a priori_ judgement
and a judgement of perception.[27] The merely numerically universal
judgement, and the merely numerically particular judgement[28] are
simply aggregates of singular judgements, and therefore are
indistinguishable in principle from the singular judgement. If then we
ask what conceptions are really presupposed by the kinds of judgement
which Kant seeks to distinguish in the first division, we can only
reply that the universal judgement presupposes the conception of a
connected or systematic whole of attributes, and that the singular
judgement presupposes the conception of the coexistence of two
attributes in a common subject. Neither kind of judgement presupposes
the conception of quantity or the conceptions of unity, plurality, and
totality.

[27] I owe this view of the distinction to Professor Cook
Wilson's lectures on logic.

[28] 'Some coroners are doctors' of course in some contexts
means, 'it is possible for a coroner to be a doctor,' and is
therefore not n