e act
which produces unity by arranging] different representations
under a common representation' has no justification in its
immediate context, and is occasioned solely by the
forthcoming description of judgement. (2) Kant has no right
to distinguish the activity which _originates_ conceptions,
or upon which they depend, from the activity which _uses_
conceptions, viz. judgement. For the act of arranging diverse
representations under a common representation which
originates conceptions is the act of judgement as Kant
describes it. (3) It is wholly artificial to speak of
judgement as 'the representation of a representation of an
object'.

Having explained the nature of the understanding, Kant proceeds to
take the next step. His aim being to connect the understanding with
the categories, and the categories being a plurality, he has to show
that the activity of judgement can be differentiated into several
kinds, each of which must subsequently be shown to involve a special
category. Hence, solely in view of the desired conclusion, and in
spite of the fact that he has described the activity of judgement as
if it were always of the same kind, he passes in effect from the
singular to the plural and asserts that 'all the functions of the
understanding can be discovered, when we can completely exhibit the
functions of unity in judgements'. After this preliminary transition,
he proceeds to assert that, if we abstract in general from all content
of a judgement and fix our attention upon the mere form of the
understanding, we find that the function of thinking in a judgement
can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three
subdivisions. These, which are borrowed with slight modifications from
Formal Logic, are expressed as follows.[16]

I. _Quantity._
Universal
Particular
Singular.

II. _Quality._
Affirmative
Negative
Infinite.

III. _Relation._
Categorical
Hypothetical
Disjunctive.

IV. _Modality._
Problematic
Assertoric
Apodeictic.

These distinctions, since they concern only the form of judgements,
belong, according to Kant, to the activity of judgement as such, and
in fact constitute its essential differentiations.

[16] B. 95, M. 58.

Now, before we consider whether this is really the case, we should
ask what answer Kant's account of judgement w