Hence he regards judgement as the act of unifying a manifold given in
perception, directly, or indirectly by means of a conception. But this
is not the problem with which Formal Logic is occupied. Formal Logic
assumes judgement to be an act which relates material given to it in
the shape of 'conceptions' or 'judgements' by analysis of this
material, and seeks to discover the various modes of relation thereby
effected. The work of judgement, however, cannot consist _both_ in
relating particulars through a conception _and_ in relating two
conceptions or judgements.

[18] Moreover, the forms of judgement clearly lack the
systematic character which Kant claims for them. Even if it
be allowed that the subdivisions within the four main heads
of quantity, quality, relation, and modality are based upon
single principles of division, it cannot be said that the
four heads themselves originate from a common principle.

[19] In the case of the third division, the plurality unified
will be two prior judgements.

It may be urged that this criticism only affects Kant's argument, but
not his conclusion. Possibly, it may be said, the list of types of
judgement borrowed from Formal Logic really expresses the essential
differentiations of judgement, and, in that case, Kant's only mistake
is that he bases them upon a false or at least inappropriate account
of judgement.[20] Moreover, since this list furnishes Kant with the
'clue' to the categories, provided that it expresses the essential
differentiations of judgement, the particular account of judgement
upon which it is based is a matter of indifference.

[20] It may be noted that the account cannot be merely
inappropriate to the general problem, if it be _incompatible_
with that assumed by Formal Logic.

This contention leads us to consider the last stage of Kant's
argument, in which he deduces the categories in detail from his list
of the forms of judgement. For it is clear that unless the forms of
judgement severally involve the categories, it will not matter whether
these forms are or are not the essential differentiations of
judgement.

Kant's mode of connecting the categories in detail with the forms of
judgement discovered by Formal Logic is at least as surprising as his
mode of connecting the latter with the nature of judgement in general.
Since the twelve distinctions within the form of judgement are to
serve as a clue to the co