pearance produced by an object, the conception
could never be related to the object in the sense required, viz. that
it applies to it; for an appearance does not _apply to_ but is
_produced_ by the object. Consequently, when Kant is considering a
conception, and therefore also when he is considering a judgement,
which is the use of a conception, he is really thinking of the
perception to which it is related as an _object of_ perception, i. e.
as a perceived individual, and he has ceased to think of a perception
as an appearance produced by an object.[13] Hence in considering
Kant's account of a conception and of judgement, we should ignore his
account of perception, and therefore also his statement that judgement
is the mediate knowledge of an object.

[12] B. 74-6, M. 45-6.

[13] Kant, in _illustrating_ the nature of a judgement,
evades the difficulty occasioned by his account of
perception, by illustrating a 'perception' by the 'conception
of body', and 'objects' by 'certain phenomena'. He thereby
covertly substitutes the relation of universal and individual
for the relation of an appearance and the object which causes
it.

If we do so, we see that Kant's account of judgement simply amounts to
this: 'Judgement is the use of a conception or 'universal'; the use of
a conception or universal consists in bringing under it corresponding
individuals or species. Consequently, judgement is a function
producing unity. If, for instance, we judge 'All bodies are
divisible', we thereby unify 'bodies' with other kinds of divisible
things by bringing them under the conception of divisibility; and if
we judge 'This body is divisible' we thereby unify this divisible
body with others by bringing it and them under the conception of
divisibility.'[14] Again, since 'the understanding in general can be
represented as a _faculty of judging_', it follows that the activity
of the understanding consists in introducing unity into our
representations, by bringing individuals or species--both these being
representations--under the corresponding universal or conception.[15]

[14] It is not Kant's general account of judgement given in
this passage, but the account of perception incompatible with
it, which leads him to confine his illustrations to universal
judgements.

[15] We may note three minor points. (1) Kant's definition of
function as 'the unity of the act of arranging [i. e. th