tanding to judgements, so that the
_understanding_ in general can be represented as a _faculty of
judging_."[11]

[11] B. 92-4, M. 56-7.

It is not worth while to go into all the difficulties of this confused
and artificial passage. Three points are clear upon the surface. In
the first place, the account of the understanding now given differs
from that given earlier in the _Critique_[12] in that, instead of
merely distinguishing, it separates the sensibility and the
understanding, and treats them as contributing, not two inseparable
factors involved in all knowledge, but two kinds of knowledge. In the
second place, the guise of argument is very thin, and while Kant
ostensibly _proves_, he really only _asserts_ that the understanding
is the faculty of judgement. In the third place, in describing
judgement Kant is hampered by trying to oppose it as the mediate
knowledge of an object to perception as the immediate knowledge of an
object. A perception is said to relate immediately to an object; in
contrast with this, a conception is said to relate immediately only to
another conception or to a perception, and mediately to an object
through relation to a perception, either directly or through another
conception. Hence a judgement, as being the use of a conception, viz.
the predicate of the judgement, is said to be the mediate knowledge of
an object. But if this distinction be examined, it will be found that
two kinds of immediate relation are involved, and that the account of
perception is not really compatible with that of judgement. When a
perception is said to relate immediately to an object, the relation in
question is that between a sensation or appearance produced by an
object acting upon or affecting the sensibility and the object which
produces it. But when a conception is said to relate immediately to
another conception or to a perception, the relation in question is
that of universal and particular, i. e. that of genus and species or
of universal and individual. For the conception is said to be 'valid
for' (i. e. to 'apply to') and to 'comprehend' the conception or
perception to which it is immediately related; and again, when a
conception is said to relate mediately to an object, the relation
meant is its 'application' to the object, even though in this case
the application is indirect. Now if a perception to which a
conception is related--either directly or indirectly through another
conception--were an ap