er words, the terms
'perception' and 'knowledge' ought to stand for the activities of
perceiving and knowing respectively, and not for the reality perceived
or known. Similarly, the terms 'idea' and 'representation'--the latter
of which has been used as a synonym for Kant's _Vorstellung_--ought to
stand not for something thought of or represented, but for the act of
thinking or representing.
Further, this second implication throws light on the proper meaning of
the terms 'form of perception' and 'form of knowledge or of thought'.
For, in accordance with this implication, a 'form of perception' and a
'form of knowledge' ought to refer to the nature of our acts of
perceiving and knowing or thinking respectively, and not to the nature
of the realities perceived or known. Consequently, Kant was right in
making the primary antithesis involved in the term 'form of
perception' that between a way in which we perceive and a way in which
things are, or, in other words, between a characteristic of our
perceiving nature and a characteristic of the reality perceived.
Moreover, Kant was also right in making this distinction a real
antithesis and not a mere distinction within one and the same thing
regarded from two points of view. That which is a form of perception
cannot also be a form of the reality and vice versa. Thus we may
illustrate a perceived form of perception by pointing out that our
apprehension of the physical world (1) is a temporal process, and (2)
is conditioned by perspective. Both the succession and the conditions
of perspective belong to the act of perception, and do not form part
of the nature of the world perceived. And it is significant that in
our ordinary consciousness it never occurs to us to attribute either
the perspective or the time to the reality perceived. Even if it be
difficult in certain cases, as in that of colour, to decide whether
something belongs to our act of perception or not, we never suppose
that it can be _both_ a form of perception _and_ a characteristic of
the reality perceived. We think that if it be the one, it cannot be
the other.
Moreover, if we pass from perception to knowledge or thought--which in
this context may be treated as identical--and seek to illustrate a
form of knowledge or of thought, we may cite the distinction of
logical subject and logical predicate of a judgement. The distinction
as it should be understood--for it does not necessitate a difference
of grammatical
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