hat, when we consider what we
really think, we find that we think that the relation between a knower
and reality is not of the second kind. If we consider what we mean by
'a reality', we find that we mean by it something which is not
correlative to a mind knowing it. It does not mean something the
thought of which disappears with the thought of a mind actually
knowing it, but something which, though it can be known by a mind,
need not be actually known by a mind. Again, just as we think of a
reality as something which _can_ stand as object in the relation of
knowledge, without necessarily being in this relation, so, as we see
when we reflect, we think of a knowing mind as something which _can_
stand as subject in this relation without necessarily being in the
relation. For though we think of the capacities which constitute the
nature of a knowing mind as only recognized through their
actualizations, i. e. through actual knowing, we think of the mind
which is possessed of these capacities as something apart from their
actualization.

It is now possible to direct attention to two characteristics of
perception and knowledge with which Kant's treatment of space and time
conflicts, and the recognition of which reveals his procedure in its
true light.

It has been already urged that both knowledge and perception--which,
though not identical with knowledge, is presupposed by it--are
essentially of _reality_. Now, in the _first_ place, it is thereby
implied that the relation between the mind and reality in knowledge or
in perception is essentially direct, i. e. that there is no _tertium
quid_ in the form of an 'idea' or a 'representation' between us as
perceiving or knowing and what we perceive or know. In other words, it
is implied that Locke's view is wrong in principle, and, in fact, the
contrary of the truth. In the _second_ place, it is implied that while
the whole fact of perception includes the reality perceived and the
whole fact of knowledge includes the reality known, since both
perception and knowledge are 'of', and therefore inseparable from a
reality, yet the reality perceived or known is essentially distinct
from, and cannot be stated in terms of, the perception or the
knowledge. Just as neither perception nor knowledge can be stated in
terms of the reality perceived or known from which they are
distinguished, so the reality perceived or known cannot be stated in
terms of the perception or the knowledge. In oth