ements which are so related we
must apprehend them so related.[7] To apprehend a surface is to
apprehend a surface of a volume. To apprehend a volume is to apprehend
a volume bounded by a surface. To apprehend a universal is to
apprehend it as the universal of an individual, and vice versa.[8] In
the case of relations of this kind, the being of either element which
stands in the relation is relative to that of the other; neither can
be real without the other, as we see if we try to think of one without
the other. And it is at least possible that knowledge and reality or,
speaking more strictly, a knower and reality, are related in this way.

[7] It is, of course, possible to say significantly that two
elements, A and B, are related as universal and individual,
or as surface and volume, if we are trying to explain what we
mean by 'universal and individual' or 'surface and volume';
but in that case we are elucidating the relationship through
the already known relation of A and B, and are not giving
information about the hitherto unknown relation of A and B.

[8] Professor Cook Wilson has pointed out that the
distinction between these two kinds of relation is marked
in language in that, for instance, while we speak of the
'relation _of_ universal _and_ individual', we speak of
'the relation _between_ one man _and_ another', or of 'the
relation _of_ one man _to_ another', using, however, the
phrase 'the relation _of_ doctor _and_ patient', when we
consider two men only as in that relation.

I owe to him recognition of the fact that the use of the word
'relation' in connexion with such terms as 'universal and
individual' is really justified.

What is, however, at least a strong presumption against this view is
to be found in the fact that while relations of the second kind are
essentially non-temporal, the relation of knowing is essentially
temporal. The relation of a universal and its individuals, or of a
surface and the volume which it bounds, does not either come to be, or
persist, or cease. On the other hand, it is impossible to think of a
knowing which is susceptible of no temporal predicates and is not
bound up with a process; and the thought of knowing as something which
comes to be involves the thought that the elements which become thus
related exist independently of the relation. Moreover, the real
refutation of the view lies in the fact t