perceived as also a perception. We find two consecutive
paragraphs[13] of which the aim is apparently to establish the
contrary conclusions: (1) that time is only the form of our internal
state and not of external phenomena, and (2) that time is the formal
condition of all phenomena, external and internal.

[13] B. 49-50 (b) and (c), M. 30 (b) and (c).

To establish the first conclusion, Kant argues that time has nothing
to do with shape or position, but, on the contrary, determines the
relation of representations in our internal state. His meaning is that
we have a succession of perceptions or representations of bodies in
space,[14] and that while the bodies perceived are not related
temporally, our perceptions or representations of them are so
related. Here 'representations' refers to our apprehension, and
is distinguished from what is represented, viz. bodies in space.

[14] Kant here refers to bodies by the term 'phenomena', but
their character as phenomena is not relevant to his argument.

How, then, does Kant reach the second result? He remembers that bodies
in space are 'phenomena', i. e. representations. He is, therefore,
able to point out that all representations belong, as determinations
of the mind, to our internal state, whether they have external things,
i. e. bodies in space, for their objects or not, and that,
consequently, they are subject to time. Hence time is concluded to be
the form of all phenomena. In this second argument, however, it is
clear that Kant has passed from his previous treatment of bodies in
space as something represented or perceived to the treatment of them
as themselves representations or perceptions.[15]

[15] It may be noted that Kant's assertion (B. 50, M. 31)
that time is the immediate condition of internal phenomena,
and thereby also mediately the condition of external
phenomena, does not help to reconcile the two positions.

In conclusion, we may point out an insoluble difficulty in Kant's
account of time. His treatment of space and time as the forms of outer
and inner sense respectively implies that, while spatial relations
apply to the realities which we perceive, temporal relations apply
solely to our perceptions of them. Unfortunately, however, as Kant in
certain contexts is clearly aware, time also belongs to the realities
perceived. The moon, for instance, moves round the earth. Thus there
are what may be called real successions as well