ossible infinity of a series of
'perceptions'.

[1] B. 532-3, M. 315.

[2] B. 523, M. 309.

[3] B. 521, M. 308.

This contention, if successful, is clearly important. If it could be
shown that the treatment of the world as a thing in itself is the
source of a contradiction, we should have what at least would seem a
strong, if not conclusive, ground for holding that the world is a
phenomenon, and, consequently, that the distinction between phenomena
and things in themselves is valid.

Professor Cook Wilson has, however, pointed out that Kant's own
doctrine does not avoid the difficulty. For, though, according to
Kant, the infinity of actual representations of spaces and times is
only possible, yet the possibilities of these representations will be
themselves infinite, and, as such, will give rise to contradictions
similar to those involved in the infinity of space and time. Moreover,
as Professor Cook Wilson has also pointed out, there is no
contradiction involved in the thought of the world as spatial and
temporal; for, as we see when we reflect, we always presuppose that
space and time are infinite, and we are only tempted to think that
they must be finite, because, when maintaining that the world must be
a whole, we are apt to make the false assumption, without in any way
questioning it, that any whole must be finite.

CHAPTER V

TIME AND INNER SENSE

The arguments by which Kant seeks to show that time is not a
determination of things in themselves but only a form of perception
are, _mutatis mutandis_, identical with those used in his treatment of
space.[1] They are, therefore, open to the same criticisms, and need
no separate consideration.

[1] Cf. B. 46-9, Secs. 4, 5 and 6 (a), M. 28-30, Secs. 5, 6 and
7 (a) with B. 38-42, Sec. 2 (1-4), and Sec. (3) to (a) inclusive,
M. 23-6, Secs. 2, 3, and 4 (a). The only qualification needed is
that, since the parts of time cannot, like those of space,
be said to exist simultaneously, B. Sec. 4 (5), M. Sec. 5, 5 is
compelled to appeal to a different consideration from that
adduced in the parallel passage on space (B. Sec. 2 (4), M. Sec.
2, 4). Since, however, B. Sec. 4 (5), M. Sec. 5, 5 introduces no
new matter, but only appeals to the consideration already urged
(B. Sec. 4, 4, M. Sec. 5, 4), this difference can be neglected.
B. Sec. 5, M. Sec. 6 adds a remark about change which does not
affect the