e mind, and
capable with any plausibility of being identified with bodies in
space. In other words, in order to think of the world as dependent on
the mind, we have to think of it as consisting only of a succession of
appearances, and in fact Berkeley, and, at certain times, Kant, did
think of it in this way.
[2] Cf. p. 119.
[3] Though not apart from relation to the mind of some other
kind.
That this is the inevitable result of idealism is not noticed, so long
as it is supposed that the essential relation of realities to the mind
consists in their being known; for, as we have seen, nothing is
thereby implied as to their special nature. To say of a reality that
it is essentially an object of knowledge is merely to add to the
particular nature ordinarily attributed to the existent in question
the further characteristic that it must be known.[4] Moreover,
since in fact, though contrary to the theory, any reality exists
independently of the knowledge of it, when the relation thought of
between a reality and the mind is _solely_ that of knowledge, the
realities can be thought of as independent of the mind. Consequently,
the physical world can be thought to have that independence of the
mind which the ordinary man attributes to it, and, therefore, need not
be conceived as only a succession of appearances. But the advantage of
this form of idealism is really derived from the very fact which it
is the aim of idealism in general to deny. For the conclusion that the
physical world consists of a succession of appearances is only avoided
by taking into account the relation of realities to the mind by way of
knowledge, and, then, without being aware of the inconsistency, making
use of the independent existence of the reality known.
[4] Cf. p. 116.
Again, that the real contrary to realism is _subjective_ idealism is
confirmed by the history of the theory of knowledge from Descartes
onwards. For the initial supposition which has originated and
sustained the problem is that in knowledge the mind is, at any rate in
the first instance, confined within itself. This supposition granted,
it has always seemed that, while there is no difficulty in
understanding the mind's acquisition of knowledge of what belongs to
its own being, it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand how
it can acquire knowledge of what does not belong to its own being.
Further, since the physical world is ordinarily thought of as
some
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