dence between
one reality and another.
Further, if reality be allowed to exist independently of knowledge, it
is easy to see that, from the idealist's point of view, Kant's
procedure was essentially right, and that all idealism, when pressed,
must prove subjective; in other words, that the idealist must hold
that the mind can only know what is mental and belongs to its own
being, and that the so-called physical world is merely a succession of
appearances. Moreover, our instinctive procedure[2] is justified. For,
in the first place, since it is impossible to think that a reality
depends for its existence upon being known, it is impossible to reach
an idealistic conclusion by taking into account relation by way of
knowledge; and if this be the relation considered, the only conclusion
can be that all reality is independent of the mind. Again, since
knowledge is essentially of reality as it is apart from its being
known, the assertion that a reality is dependent upon the mind is an
assertion of the kind of thing which it is in itself, apart from its
being known.[3] And when we come to consider what we mean by saying of
a reality that it depends upon the mind, we find we mean that it is in
its own nature of such a kind as to disappear with the disappearance
of the mind, or, more simply, that it is of the kind called mental.
Hence, we can only decide that a particular reality depends upon the
mind by appeal to its special character. We cannot treat it simply as
a reality the relation of which to the mind is solely that of
knowledge. And we can only decide that all reality is dependent upon
the mind by appeal to the special character of all the kinds of
reality of which we are aware. Hence, Kant in the _Aesthetic_, and
Berkeley before him, were essentially right in their procedure. They
both ignored consideration of the world simply as a reality, and
appealed exclusively to its special character, the one arguing that in
its special character as spatial and temporal it presupposed a
percipient, and the other endeavouring to show that the primary
qualities are as relative to perception as the secondary.
Unfortunately for their view, in order to think of bodies in space as
dependent on the mind, it is necessary to think of them as being in
the end only certain sensations or certain combinations of sensations
which may be called appearances. For only sensations or combinations
of them can be thought of as at once dependent on th
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