f the reality
is essentially relative to a knower, the knower knows it as it is, for
what it is is what it is in this relation.'

The fundamental objection, however, to this line of thought is that it
contradicts the very nature of knowledge. Knowledge unconditionally
presupposes that the reality known exists independently of the
knowledge of it, and that we know it as it exists in this
independence. It is simply _impossible_ to think that any reality
depends upon our knowledge of it, or upon any knowledge of it. If
there is to be knowledge, there must first _be_ something to be known.
In other words, knowledge is essentially discovery, or the finding of
what already is. If a reality could only be or come to be in virtue of
some activity or process on the part of the mind, that activity or
process would not be 'knowing', but 'making' or 'creating', and to
make and to know must in the end be admitted to be mutually
exclusive.[1]

[1] Cf. pp. 235-6.

This presupposition that what is known exists independently of being
known is quite general, and applies to feeling and sensation just as
much as to parts of the physical world. It must in the end be conceded
of a toothache as much as of a stone that it exists independently of
the knowledge of it. There must be a pain to be attended to or
noticed, which exists independently of our attention or notice. The
true reason for asserting feeling and sensation to be dependent on the
mind is that they presuppose not a knowing, but a feeling and a
sentient subject respectively. Again, it is equally presupposed that
knowing in no way alters or modifies the thing known. We can no more
think that in apprehending a reality we do not apprehend it as it is
apart from our knowledge of it, than we can think that its existence
depends upon our knowledge of it. Hence, if 'things in themselves'
means 'things existing independently of the knowledge of them',
knowledge is essentially of 'things in themselves'. It is, therefore,
unnecessary to consider whether idealism is assisted by the
supposition of a non-finite knowing mind, correlated with reality as a
whole. For reality must equally be independent of it. Consequently, if
the issue between idealism and realism is whether the physical world
is or is not dependent on the mind, it cannot turn upon a dependence
in respect of knowledge.

That the issue does not turn upon knowledge is confirmed by our
instinctive procedure when we are asked