elongs to the same perception of a great circle accidentally, e. g.
its apparent colour, which is valid only for a particular organization
of this or that sense.[37] In this way he correlates what the great
circle really is, as well as what it looks, with perception, and so is
able to speak of what it is for perception. But, in fact, what the
great circle is, is correlated with thought, and not with perception;
and if we raise Kant's transcendental problem in reference not to
perception but to thought, it cannot be solved in Kant's agnostic
manner. For it is a presupposition of thinking that things are in
themselves what we think them to be; and from the nature of the case a
presupposition of thinking not only cannot be rightly questioned, but
cannot be questioned at all.

[36] Cf. pp. 72-3.

[37] In the _Prol._, Sec. 13, Remark iii, Kant carefully
distinguishes judgement from perception, but destroys the
effect of the distinction by regarding judgement as referring
to what is relative to perception, viz. appearances.

NOTE ON THE FIRST ANTINOMY

Kant holds that the antinomy or contradiction which arises when we
consider the character of the world as spatial and temporal, viz. that
we are equally bound to hold that the world is infinite in space and
time, and that it is finite in space and time, is due to regarding the
world as a thing in itself. He holds that the contradiction
disappears, as soon as it is recognized that the world is only a
phenomenon, for then we find that we need only say that the world is
_capable_ of being extended infinitely in respect of time and
space.[1] Objects in space and time are only phenomena, and, as such,
are actual only in perception. When we say that a past event, or that
a body which we do not perceive, is real, we merely assert the
possibility of a 'perception'. "All events from time immemorial prior
to my existence mean nothing else than the possibility of prolonging
the chain of experience from the present perception upwards to the
conditions which determine this perception according to time."[2]
"That there may be inhabitants of the moon, although no one has ever
seen them, must certainly be admitted, but this assertion only means
that we could come upon them in the possible progress of
experience."[3] The contradictions, therefore, can be avoided by
substituting for the actual infinity of space and time, as relating to
things in themselves, the p