.[35] Kant, no doubt, is thinking
of a real presupposition of the process by which we distinguish
between the real and the apparent qualities of bodies, i. e. between
what they are and what they appear. We presuppose that that quality is
really, and not only apparently, a quality of a body, which we and
every one, judging from what it looks under various conditions (i. e.
'in universal experience'), must believe it to possess in itself and
independently of all perception. His mistake is that in formulating
this presupposition he treats as an appearance, and so as relative to
perception, just that which is being distinguished from what, as an
appearance, is relative to perception.

[34] Hence Kant's protest (B. 45, M. 27), against
illustrating the ideality of space by the 'inadequate'
examples of colour, taste, &c., must be unavailing. For his
contention is that, while the assertion that space is not a
property of things means that it is not a property of things
in themselves, the assertion that colour, for example, is not
a property of a rose only means that it is not a property of
a thing in itself in an empirical sense, i. e. of an
appearance of a special kind.

[35] Cf. pp. 72-3.

Underlying the mistake is the identification of perception with
judgement. Our apprehension of what things _are_ is essentially a
matter of thought or judgement, and not of perception. We do not
_perceive_[36] but _think_ a thing as it is. It is true that we can
follow Kant's language so far as to say that our judgement that the
portion of the great circle joining two points on the surface of a
sphere is the shortest way between them _via_ the surface belongs
essentially to the thinking faculty of every intelligent being, and
also that it is valid for all intelligences, in the sense that they
must all hold it to be true; and we can contrast this judgement with a
perception of the portion of the great circle as something which,
though it cannot be said to be invalid, still differs for different
beings according to the position from which they perceive it. Kant,
however, treats the judgement as a _perception_; for if we apply his
general assertion to this instance, we find him saying that what we
judge the portion of the great circle to be essentially belongs to the
_perception_ of it, and is valid for the _sensuous_ faculty of every
human being, and that thereby it can be distinguished from what
b