pothesi_
things _are_ spatially related, and our states _are_ temporally
related.
[10] Cf. B. 49 (b) line 2, M. 30 (b) line 2
[11] Cf. pp. 38-40.
Kant's procedure, therefore, may be summed up by saying that he
formulates a view which is true but at the same time inconsistent with
his general position, the view, viz. that while things in space are
not temporally related, the acts by which we come to apprehend them
are so related; and further, that he is deceived by the verbally easy
transition from a legitimate way of expressing this view, viz. that
time is the form of our states, to the desired conclusion that time is
the form of inner sense.
The untenable character of Kant's position with regard to time and the
knowledge of ourselves can be seen in another way. It is not difficult
to show that, in order to prove that we do not know _things_, but only
the appearances which they produce, we must allow that we do know
_ourselves_, and not appearances produced by ourselves, and,
consequently, that time is real and not phenomenal. To show this, it
is only necessary to consider the objection which Kant himself quotes
against his view of time. The objection is important in itself, and
Kant himself remarks that he has heard it so unanimously urged by
intelligent men that he concludes that it must naturally present
itself to every reader to whom his views are novel. According to Kant,
it runs thus: "Changes are real (this is proved by the change of our
own representations, even though all external phenomena, together with
their changes, be denied). Now changes are only possible in time;
therefore time is something real."[12] And he goes on to explain why
this objection is so unanimously brought, even by those who can bring
no intelligible argument against the ideality of space. "The reason is
that men have no hope of proving apodeictically the absolute reality
of space, because they are confronted by idealism, according to which
the reality of external objects is incapable of strict proof, whereas
the reality of the object of our internal senses (of myself and my
state) is immediately clear through consciousness. External objects
might be mere illusion, but the object of our internal senses is to
their mind undeniably something real."[13]
[12] B. 53, M. 32.
[13] B. 55, M. 33.
Here, though Kant does not see it, he is faced with a difficulty from
which there is no escape. On the one hand, accordin
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