and in the field, asserted
that those operations were based upon his "plans and wishes," which
had been "fully explained" to me _before I went to Pulaski_, and
"properly appreciated," instead of upon what I had gathered from
General Thomas's orders to Stanley and subsequent orders to me
about fighting Hood at Pulaski, absolutely contradictory to that
stated in his report, "without risking a general engagement," and
his assent to my _radically different_ suggestions made _after I
assumed command at Pulaski_, as stated in my report. It is not
incumbent upon me to try to reconcile this statement in General
Thomas's report with the correspondence, above referred to, found
in the official records; and I see no reason for desiring any
further corroboration of the strict accuracy of the contrary
statement made by me in my report. I am entirely willing to leave
any discussion of that subject to others.

In view of the fact that I was not one of General Thomas's corps
commanders, but an army commander, holding the same grade of command,
by special assignment of the President under the law, as General
Thomas himself, he might without military impropriety have left to
me in his report, as he had before done in fact, whether intentionally
or not, the entire responsibility of the operations of the army
under my immediate command from Pulaski to Nashville. The record
shows that, from the necessities of the case, I was compelled to
act, and did act, upon my own judgment from the beginning to the
end, not only without any timely orders, but generally without
timely or accurate information from General Thomas; and that he
approved, from time to time and finally, all that I had done. The
question as to why he afterward claimed that all had been done in
pursuance of his plans and wishes, fully explained to me _in
advance_, I must leave to others. He was certainly under no official
obligation to take upon himself any such responsibility. It may
be true, as General Sherman said and General Thomas admitted, that
it was his duty to take command in the field himself. But it was
not his duty, being in the rear, to hamper the actual army commander
in the field with embarrassing orders or instructions, nor to take
upon himself the responsibility of failure or success. If I had
failed in those hazardous operations, nobody could have held General
Thomas responsible, unless for neglect of duty in not commanding
himself in person, or in not