for good and sufficient reasons, very frequently during
a long time, may continue to be very accurate. However this may
be, perfect candor compels me to say here that I have never been
able to recall any conversation with General Thomas at any time in
respect to his plans or wishes in the event of Hood's advance from
the Tennessee before Thomas was ready to assume the offensive. I
now believe, as I always have done, that the only information I
ever received from General Thomas on that subject was that contained
in the telegraphic correspondence quoted in this volume. There is
now no doubt in my mind, and, so far as I can recall, never has
been any, that when I met General Thomas at Nashville, on my way
to Johnsonville, he expected A. J. Smith to arrive from Missouri
very soon, when he intended to concentrate all his available troops
at Columbia and Pulaski, take command in person, and move against
Hood; and that he considered his orders of November 8 to Stanley,
to fight Hood at Pulaski or Columbia, as Hood might elect, until
he (Thomas) could get there with reinforcements, all the orders
that could be necessary, even if Hood did get a little the start
of him. The records seem to show, still further, that even after
Hood's plans of aggression had developed so long in advance of
Thomas's preparations to meet him, Thomas did not then see the
great danger that might result from obedience to his orders of
November 8 to Stanley, and even went so far as to repeat those
orders to me on the 19th; but that he promptly corrected that
mistake when I pointed it out to him, and then authorized me to
act upon my own judgment.

Now, at this late day, when I am so much older than General Thomas
was at the time of these events, I feel at liberty to discuss them
without reserve. I am not criticizing the acts of my official
superior. In my mature judgment, General Thomas was not justifiable,
in 1864-1865, in claiming the credit for what had been done by his
inferior in rank in actual command of the army in the field while
General Thomas himself was absent.

INCONSISTENCIES IN GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT

So, in respect to the battle of Nashville, it would have been
utterly impossible to have given any rational explanation of the
action of my troops on December 15 under the published orders for
that battle. Hence I alluded, as lightly as possible, to the
modification in those orders which accounted f