s
could possibly have wished to expunge anything from his official
record. Hence, I repeat, that feature of the report signed by
General Thomas could not have been his.

INCONSISTENCIES IN GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT

In this connection it is to be observed that General Thomas had
not, at the time I went back to report to him in Tennessee, any
anxiety about his inability to cope with Hood after the arrival of
the Twenty-third Corps. He had assured General Sherman of his
entire confidence.( 1) He had ordered me to march, as Stanley had
done, from Tullahoma to Pulaski; but the action of Forrest at
Johnsonville about that time caused General Thomas to change his
orders and hurry me by rail to Nashville, and thence to Johnsonville,
with the advance of my troops, he wishing to see me in person as
I passed through Nashville.( 2) It would not be an unreasonable
presumption that the burden of conversation in that brief interview
was in respect to the alarming condition of Johnsonville at that
time, rather than in respect to some future defensive operations
against Hood, then hardly anticipated. Indeed, the entire
correspondence of that period, including that which occurred between
General Thomas and General Sherman, about which it is important to
note that I knew nothing at that time, shows that General Thomas
then expected to concentrate his troops at Columbia or Pulaski, or
both, in a very short time, take command in the field in person,
and begin aggressive operations against Hood. It seems extremely
probable that General Thomas had given very little thought at that
time to the subject of defensive action, except as against what
that troublesome cavalryman Forrest might do. It seems far more
probable from the record that General Thomas's "plans and wishes"
in respect to defensive action against Hood's advance into Tennessee,
which I had so "properly appreciated and executed," were, like the
plans of the battle of December 16 at Nashville, matured after the
event, or at least after Hood's advance into Tennessee had actually
begun, and after I had, in my telegram to General Thomas of November
20, pointed out to him the dangers of his previous plan, telegraphed
to me the day before.

I do not think much importance is generally to be attached to what
any man may or may not recall to memory after the lapse of many
years, although the recollection of a recent event, repeated in
the memory,