lanations he might think necessary, then to call attention
myself to the necessity for any such explanations. It would have
been impossible to give any rational explanation of the false
position occupied by the troops at Pulaski up to the very last
moment of safety except by reference to Thomas's orders to Stanley
and me, and the subsequent correspondence on that subject. Stanley,
with the blunt frankness justified by comradeship, had pointed it
out to me the moment we met at Pulaski, while I was governed by
the utmost delicacy in discussing the question with General Thomas,
so as to avoid suggesting to him that he had made a mistake. Yet
so evident was the mistake that I stopped the advance of the Twenty-
third Corps some miles north of Pulaski, and no part of that corps
actually went to that place. Cox was sent back to a point where
he could interpose between Hood and Columbia, and Ruger was stopped
at Columbia.

The great tenacity with which I held on at Columbia and on the
north bank of Duck River could not have been justified except by
reference to the despatches showing Thomas's wishes and his assurance
of reinforcements at those points. If I had been free to do so,
nothing could have been plainer than my duty to have fallen back
behind the Harpeth when I found that Thomas could not or would not
reinforce me on the line of Duck River, and before Hood could
endanger my retreat. Hence I was compelled to include in the
history of that retreat the entire record of facts relating to it.

Again, necessity was the only possible excuse for fighting the
battle of Franklin on the south side of the Harpeth, where defeat
would have been disastrous; and that necessity had arisen absolutely
and solely from the want of a bridge across that river, which I
had suggested that General Thomas place there. It was not possible
for me, without utter disregard for the truth of history as well
as for my own military reputation, to attempt to conceal those
facts.

DOCUMENTS WHICH DISAPPEARED FROM THE RECORDS

It must seem remarkable that in my report, dated December 7, of
operations from November 14 to December 1, 1864, including the
battle of Franklin, on which General Thomas placed his indorsement
commending my "skill," no mention whatever was made of any orders
or instructions from General Thomas. The simple fact was that I
could not have quoted the orders and instructions General Thomas
had