impracticable on account of the enemy's
superiority in cavalry at that time, the point (Murfreesboro')
which Thomas had selected for his concentration was far enough to
the rear of that line (Duck River) to make the concentration certain
if orders were given in due time.

I learned in the afternoon of November 27, by General Thomas's
despatch of 8 A. M., already quoted, that A. J. Smith's troops were
not, as I had supposed, already in Nashville, but that some of them
were expected there that day, and would come forward to join me at
once.

In the morning of November 28, at 8:45, I reported my withdrawal
to the north side of the river, saying:

"My troops and material are all on the north side of Duck River.
The withdrawal was completed at daylight this morning without
serious difficulty. Cox holds the ford in front of Columbia, and
Ruger the railroad bridge, which I partially destroyed. Stanley
is going into position a short distance in rear of Cox. I think
I can now stop Hood's advance by any line near this, and meet in
time any distant movement to turn my position. I regret extremely
the necessity of withdrawing from Columbia, but believe it was
absolute. I will explain fully in time. Reinforcements will have
to march from Spring Hill or Thompson's Station. Supplies should
be sent to Thompson's Station."

After withdrawing to the north bank of Duck River I telegraphed on
the morning of November 28:

"I am in doubt whether it is advisable, with reference to future
operations, to hold this position or to retire to some point from
which we can move offensively. Of course we cannot recross the
river here. I could easily have held the bridge-head at the
railroad, but it would have been useless, as we could not possibly
advance from that point. Please give me your views and wishes."

This was answered by General Thomas at "8 P. M.," the answer being
received by me next morning, November 29.

It is thus seen that up to the morning of November 28 I was still
hoping for reinforcements on the line of Duck River, and thought
I could stop Hood's advance by any line near the Columbia and
Franklin pike, which I then held, as well as meet in good time any
distant movement to turn my position. Accordingly, at 9:10 A. M.
that day I telegraphed to General Thomas:

"I have all the fords above and below this place well watched and
guarded as far as possible. Wilson is operating with his main
force on my left. The