enemy does not appear to have moved in that
direction yet to any considerable distance. I will probably be
able to give you pretty full information this evening. Do you not
think the infantry at the distant crossings below here should now
be withdrawn and cavalry substituted? I do not think we can prevent
the crossing of even the enemy's cavalry, because the places are
so numerous. I think the best we can do is to hold the crossings
near us and watch the distant ones."

But I learned soon after noon of the same day that our cavalry
found the fords so numerous that they could hardly watch them all,
much less guard any of them securely; and a little later I learned
that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing at some point only
a few miles above, between Huey's Mill and the Lewisburg-Franklin
pike. At 2:30 P. M. I telegraphed General Thomas:

"The enemy was crossing in force a short distance this side of the
Lewisburg pike at noon to-day, and had driven our cavalry back
across the river on the pike at the same time. The force is reported
to be infantry, but I do not regard it as being probable. Wilson
has gone with his main force to learn the facts, and drive the
enemy back, if possible."

DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER

In the appendix to General Thomas's report the date of the above
despatch is given as "3:30 A. M." It was answered by General Thomas
at "10:30 P. M." and his answer was received by me November 29 (no
hour mentioned in the records). The Department of the Ohio records
say that I sent it at "2:30 P. M." The appendix to my report
mentions the date "November 29," but does not give the hour. My
official report, as published, also says this information was
received "about 2 A. M. on the 29th"; but this is evidently a
clerical error: Clearly the report should read, "about 2 P. M. on
the 28th."

But our cavalry was unable to drive that of the enemy back, and
hence Hood was free to lay his pontoon bridge and cross his infantry
and artillery at any point above Columbia. We had not been able
to hold even the crossings near us.

The same day, November 28, at 4 P. M., I telegraphed:

"If Hood advances on the Lewisburg and Franklin pike, where do you
propose to fight him? I have all the force that is necessary here,
and General Smith's troops should be placed with reference to the
proposed point of concentration."

And again, at 6 P. M.:

"The en