physician would retire, and give the worsted malaria a chance to
recuperate and "come to time" for another attack; and so on
indefinitely until either the man or the malaria--often the man--
finally got "knocked out." It was not until after much study and
some practice of the art of war that I conceived for myself the
idea of giving the enemy of my youth, which still clung to me, no
chance to recover after I once got him down. He has never got the
better of me since.

THOMAS'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR

Had Thomas's plan been carried out, he would have been ready, with
a fine army splendidly equipped and supplied, to start from the
Tennessee River to invade the Gulf States, as had been done the
year before, just about the time the plans actually adopted resulted
in the surrender of all the Confederate armies. In Thomas's mind
war seems to have become the normal condition of the country. He
had apparently as yet no thought of its termination. The campaign
from the Tennessee River as a base had then become, like the "autumn
manoeuvers" of an European army, a regular operation to be commenced
at the proper time every year. In his general order of December
29, he said the enemy, "unless he is mad, must forever relinquish
all hope of bringing Tennessee again within the lines of the accursed
rebellion"; but the possible termination of that rebellion appeared
to be a contingency too remote to be taken into account in planning
future military operations.

[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 39.]

[( 2) See Vol. XLV, part I, p. 37.]

[( 3) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 50.]

[( 4) I did not see General Thomas after this letter was written.]

CHAPTER XIV
Hood's Motive in Attempting the Impossible at Nashville--Diversity
of Opinions Concerning that Battle--No Orders on Record for the
Battle of December 16--That Battle due to the Spontaneous Action
of Subordinate Commanders--Statements in the Reports of the Corps
Commanders--Explanation of the Absence of Orders--The Phraseology
of General Thomas's Report.

The official records, Hood's statement, and Sherman's estimate,
made at the time, agree pretty closely in placing Hood's infantry
force at about 30,000 men when he crossed the Tennessee and began
his advance toward Nashville. He lost a considerable number at
Spring Hill on November 29, and over 6000, besides thirteen general
officers, at Franklin on November 30.