HOOD'S MOTIVE AT NASHVILLE

As stated in his report, Thomas estimated Hood's strength as being
at least equal to his own, and with all the deliberation of his
nature, he insisted upon making the full preparations which he
considered essential to success not only in battle, but in pursuit
of a defeated enemy. From his point of view, Thomas was unquestionably
right in his action. How he came to make so great an overestimate
of the Confederate strength, in view of the means of information
in his possession and the estimate General Sherman had given him
before he started for Savannah, it is difficult to conjecture.
But the fact is now beyond question that Thomas made all those
elaborate preparations to attack an enemy of less than half his
own strength, under the belief that his adversary was at least
equal in strength to himself. That Hood then knew his own exact
strength is a matter of course, and that he did not underestimate
the strength of his adversary is almost equally certain. During
the two weeks in which his army lay in front of Nashville, if not
before, he must have ascertained very closely the strength of the
Union forces in his front. Hence Hood's "siege" of Nashville for
two weeks could not be regarded otherwise than as a stupendous
farce, were it not for the desperate bravery with which he thus
kept up the appearance of still fighting for a lost cause rather
than be the first to admit by his own action that it was indeed
lost. It is now well known that the feeling among the Southern
people and that of some of the highest officers of the Confederate
government made it impossible for any officer of their army to
admit in any public way the failure of the Confederacy until after
the enforced surrender of Lee's army in Virginia. Indeed, it
required much moral courage on the part of General Johnston
voluntarily to enter into a capitulation even after the capture of
Lee.

This is unquestionably the explanation of Hood's desperate act in
waiting in front of Nashville and inviting the destruction or
capture of his army. The crushing blow he there received was like
a death-blow delivered by a giant full of strength and vigor upon
a gladiator already beaten and reduced in strength nearly to
exhaustion. Sherman was not very far wrong when he said that "the
battle of Nashville was fought at Franklin." The gladiator had
been reduced to less than one third of his former strength by a
long series of comb