pike in rear of the enemy. About noon, the troops on my left
(Generals Smith and Wood) having advanced and come in contact with
the enemy in his new position, the enemy again withdrew from his
left a considerable force to strengthen his right and center, when
I ordered General Cox to advance in conjunction with the cavalry,
and endeavor to carry a high wooded hill beyond the flank of the
enemy's intrenched line, and overlooking the Granny White pike.
The hill was occupied by the enemy in considerable force, but was
not intrenched. My order was not executed with the promptness or
energy which I had expected, yet probably with as much as I had
reason to expect, considering the attenuated character of General
Cox's line and the great distance and rough ground over which the
attacking force had to move. The hill was, however, carried by
General Wilson's cavalry (dismounted), whose gallantry and energy
on that and other occasions which came under my observation cannot
be too greatly praised.

"Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme right, the
salient hill in front of General Couch was attacked and carried by
General Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch's
division; and the fortified hill in front of General Cox, which
constituted the extreme flank of the enemy's intrenched line, was
attacked and carried by Colonel Doolittle's brigade of General
Cox's division, the latter capturing eight pieces of artillery and
200 to 300 prisoners. These several successes, gained almost
simultaneously, resulted in a complete rout of the enemy. The
cavalry had cut off his line of retreat by the Granny White pike,
and such of his troops as were not captured on the line could only
escape by climbing the Brentwood Hills. It is believed all of the
artillery along the left and center of the enemy's line fell into
our hands. Our troops continued the pursuit across the valley and
into the Brentwood Hills, when darkness compelled them to desist,
and they bivouacked for the night."

In the histories of the battle of Nashville heretofore published,
it appears to have been assumed that the plan of battle issued to
the troops before the movement of December 15 was equally applicable
to the operations of the 16th, was so understood by the subordinate
commanders, and was the authoritative guide for their action during
the entire day of the 16th. Hence it has seemed to me necessary
to direct attention to the above