extracts from the official records,
as well as to give my own personal recollections, for the benefit
of future historians.

EXPLANATION OF THE ABSENCE OF ORDERS

Unquestionably the _general plan_ of battle embraced in the orders
of December 14 for the attack on the 15th was well applicable to
the situation which actually existed in the morning of the 16th.
It was requisite only to direct in what manner the several corps
of the army should act in _concert_ in the _changed situation_ of
both armies, as had so clearly been done for the 15th, in the
_situation then existing_. But the detailed orders requisite for
such joint action given in the plan for the battle of the 15th,
were _absolutely inapplicable_ in most essential particulars to
the situation of the 16th, or to the battle actually fought on that
day. In view of the fact that much time had very wisely been spent
by General Thomas in remounting his cavalry and in making all other
preparations necessary to insure not only the defeat, but the
destruction or capture of the enemy, and of the further fact that
the operations of the 15th had so damaged the enemy that his retreat
that night was thought at least probable, if not certain, it hardly
seems possible that General Thomas could have been willing to
postpone a renewal of the attack until he could have time to visit
"the several commands" in person, and see for himself what the
situation actually was the next day, as if the operations he had
to determine on and order were the original plans of a battle yet
to be opened, instead of the final blow to be struck against an
enemy already substantially beaten and quite probably already in
full retreat.

The only possible explanation of this very remarkable absence of
timely orders from General Thomas for the battle of December 16,
and of the long delay on that day, seems to be found in his well-
known constitutional habit, sometimes spoken of by his brother
officers who had long been familiarly acquainted with him. Unless
the opinions of those familiar acquaintances and friends were
substantially erroneous, General Thomas's habit of great deliberation
did not permit him to formulate in the night of December 15 the
comparatively simple orders requisite for the several corps to
_resume_, in the morning of the 16th, the movement "against the
enemy's left flank," which he says he "directed" to be "continued"
some time in _the a