ashville, completely reversed the situation. When Hood
recovered from the blow received at Franklin sufficiently to make
any further move, he found himself confronted no longer by an
inferior force, but by one of more than twice his own strength in
infantry, and not far, if at all, inferior to him in cavalry. The
artillery in the field is not specially considered in any of these
estimates, because it was ample in quantity and efficient in quality
on both sides, and need not be compared. This formidable army was
now in Hood's immediate front at Nashville, while the important
strategic points of Murfreesboro' and Chattanooga were strongly
garrisoned and fortified, and the railroads strongly guarded. It
had become too late for Hood to attempt a raid into Kentucky.
Thomas would have been close upon his rear with an army at least
twice as strong, with all the important points in Tennessee still
securely held. But successful operations against Nashville were
far less possible to Hood than an invasion of Kentucky. While no
commander could possibly think of destroying his own army by
assaulting a fortified place in which the garrison was more than
double his own strength, or indulge the hope of any valuable results
from a less than half investment of such a place, so bold a commander
as Hood might possibly attempt a raid into Kentucky, as the only
thing he could possibly do except retreat across the Tennessee
River, and thus abandon his cause as lost. It was this view of
the situation by General Grant and the authorities in Washington
that caused such intense anxiety on account of the delay of General
Thomas in attacking Hood at Nashville. It was perfectly evident
that Thomas could beat Hood whenever he chose to attack him, and
that Hood must be fully aware of that fact. Hence it was naturally
apprehended that Hood would either make a raid into Kentucky or
else retreat across the Tennessee River without suffering any
further damage. To those who were watching Hood closely at Nashville,
and especially to those who understood his character, there seemed
no ground for either apprehension. All his operations indicated
a serious attempt to besiege Nashville, though it was impossible
to imagine what he could hope to accomplish, unless it was to wait
in the most convenient place while his adversary, with all the
great resources of the country at his back, got ready to crush him.